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Sammendrag 
I standard lærebokteori for konsumentenes valg antas godene å være tilgjengelige i uendelig delbare 
kvanta. I mange valgsituasjoner er imidlertid godene som etterspørres kvalitative (diskrete), slike som 
varianter av differensierte produkter (transportalternativer, biler, viner, type jobb, type utdanning, 
vaskemaskiner, etc.). For slike situasjoner kan diskret valghandlingsteori (diskrete valgmodeller) 
benyttes til å analysere valgatferden til konsumentene. I standard konsumentteori kan som kjent den 
såkalte Slutsky likningen benyttes til å beregne marginale kompenserte priseffekter. Slutsky likningen 
gir sammenhengen mellom de kompenserte og de ukompenserte pris- og inntektselastisitetene, slik at 
dersom en kjenner de marginal ukompenserte pris- og inntektseffektene kan en tallfeste de tilsvarende 
marginale kompenserte effektene. 
 
I denne artikkelen utledes en aggregert Slutsky likning for diskrete valgmodeller. Det har tidligere 
ikke eksistert en tilsvarende Slutsky likning for slike modeller. Den diskrete Slutsky likningen gjør det 
dermed mulig å beregne kompenserte priselastisiteter for andelen (valgsannsynligheten) som etterspør 
et diskret alternativ på grunnlag av de tilsvarende ukompenserte pris og inntektselastisiteter. Slutsky-
ligningen i dette tilfellet skiller seg på sentrale måter fra den tilsvarende ligningen i standard 
konsumentteori. For eksempel er venstre - og høyrederiverte av de kompenserte valgsannsynlighetene 
med hensyn på pris som regel forskjellige.  
 
Til slutt diskuterer vi utvalgte spesialtilfeller. Ved hjelp av Slutsky likningen vises hvordan 
substitusjonseffekter i disse tilfellene kan beregnes via de kompenserte elastisitetene med hensyn på 




1. Introduction    
The theory of compensated demand and compensating and equivalent variations is well 
developed for the case when the commodity space is infinitely divisible: see, for example, 
Hausman (1981). However, in many instances the consumer faces choice settings where the 
alternatives are discrete. These include choice between variants of a differentiated product, 
urban transportation modes, residential locations, types of education, types of child care, etc. 
In the context of discrete choice settings, one cannot apply the standard microeconomic 
textbook approach to express demand functions. The reason is that the set of feasible 
consumption alternatives is not a continuum and the utility function is not differentiable. 
Thus, the standard approach based on marginal calculus does not apply.  
 As regards welfare analysis, the standard tools of applied welfare economics are not 
directly applicable in discrete choice situations. Nevertheless, it is important to develop 
practical welfare measures in these settings also, because welfare judgments are of major 
interest in several areas, such as the choice between transportation modes, housing 
alternatives, variants of differentiated products, types of schooling, and types of childcare. In 
these areas, welfare evaluations of public policies which change prices, taxes, and quality 
attributes of some alternatives are relevant.  
A central aspect of welfare assessment is the calculation of marginal compensating 
effects. In the traditional approach to microeconomic analysis, with infinitely divisible 
quantities of goods the Slutsky equation plays a key role. The Slutsky equation, referred to as 
the “fundamental equation in value theory” by Hicks (1936), allows one to compute the 
compensating price elasticities from the corresponding uncompensated price and income 
elasticities. Specifically, marginal compensated (Hicksian) effects are used to justify key price 
indexes and they also play an important role in the analysis of optimal taxation. In the special 
case where the utility function is linear in income there are no income effects and the 
marginal compensated effects will in general be different from the corresponding 
uncompensated effects. In this case EV and CV can be readily expressed on closed form for 
(McFadden, 1999, and Niemeier, 1997). However, when utilities are non-linear in income  
one can no longer express these welfare measures and marginal compensated effects by 
simple formulas.  
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Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) obtained analytic formulas for compensated choice 
probabilities and the distribution of welfare measures such as CV and EV in discrete choice 
models when utility is non-linear in income.1 In this paper, we employ the results obtained by 
Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) to derive compensated marginal effects for discrete choice 
models and to establish a corresponding discrete Slutsky equation (discrete Slutsky equation). 
This Slutsky equation also covers a specific case of discrete/continuous choice. It turns out 
that the discrete Slutsky equation is in part analogous to the standard Slutsky equation, but 
also differs in essential ways. A remarkable feature of the compensated marginal effects in the 
discrete case is that they are usually not symmetric, as the marginal compensated effects with 
respect to a price increase versus a price decrease may be different. In a separate paper 
(Dagsvik et al., 2019), marginal compensated effects for discrete labor supply models are 
analyzed.  
An early general and seminal treatment of welfare analysis in discrete/continuous 
choice models was undertaken by Small and Rosen (1981). They seem to be the only ones 
who have previously discussed marginal compensated effects. Their treatment is, however, 
incomplete and seems partly misleading, as will be discussed further below.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the notion of compensating 
choice and the random expenditure function in the discrete choice setting. Section 3 deals 
with joint ex-ante and ex-post compensated choice. In Section 4 we discuss marginal 
compensated effects with special reference to the Slutsky equation and in Section 5 we 
discuss some selected examples.  
 
2. Compensated discrete choice   
In discrete choice theory based on random utility representations, the notion of compensated 
demand is more complicated than in the conventional case. Also, separate treatments are 
necessary for the one-period setting and the two-period setting: that is, before (ex-ante) and 
after (ex-post) a reform is introduced. The reason for this is that in random utility models 
there is no unique deterministic correspondence between prices, expenditure, and utility 
because (indirect) utility is a random function of prices and income. The random utility 
                                                     
1 Kornstad and Thoresen (2006) and Dagsvik et al. (2009) have conducted welfare analyses based on the welfare measures 
derived in Dagsvik and Karlström (2005). 
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representation is motivated by the fact that not all variables that influence preferences are 
observable to the researcher. Some of the variables that affect preferences may even be 
random to the consumer himself. The reason is that tastes may vary in an unpredictable way 
from one moment to the next across identical choice settings due to psychological factors and 
difficulties with making a definitive assessment of the value of the alternatives. Consequently, 
the utility function, the expenditure function, CV, and EV all become interdependent random 
variables. This feature calls for a careful probabilistic analysis in the derivation of the 
respective distribution functions. 
 Consider a general setting where the consumer faces a choice between a composite 
continuous good and a set of discrete alternatives where the discrete alternatives are mutually 
exclusive. Let 0( , )jU x x
  be the utility of the quantity 0x  of the composite good and the 
quantity jx associated with the discrete alternative j, j = 1, 2,…, m. Most of the time jx will be 
equal to 1 (when alternative j is chosen) or zero, but for the sake of comparison with Small 
and Rosen (1981) we shall also consider briefly the discrete/continuous case in which jx  
takes values in (0, ).  The consumer maximizes 0( , )j jU x x
  subject to the budget constraint 
  0 1 ,
m
j jj
x x w y
=
+ =  0,jx   0,j kx x =  ,k j   
where y denotes income, jw the price of the discrete alternative j, and the price of the 
composite indivisible good with quantity 0x  is normalized to 1. Let ( , )j jU w y  be the 
conditional indirect utility given the discrete alternative j. That is, ( , )j jU w y  is the maximum 
of 0( , )j jU x x
  subject to the budget constraint 0 .j jx x w y+ =  In the pure discrete case, where 
1jx =  the indirect utility conditional on alternative j admits the form ( , ) ( ,1).j j j jU w y U y w
= −  
The general formulation above covers several cases (but not all) of interest. Consider, for 
example, the choice of working in different labor market sectors, where it is understood that 
hours of work are fixed and possibly sector-specific. In this case of sectoral labor supply 
without taxes and with fixed hours of work, the conditional indirect utility can be expressed as 
( , ) ( ,1).j j j jU w y U y w
= +  Thus, the function ( , )j jU w y  can be both increasing (occupational 




The utility of alternative j has the structure ( , ) ( , ) ,j j j j jU w y v w y = +  where ( , )j jv w y  is 
a deterministic function that is strictly increasing in y and strictly monotone in jw  and 
1 2( , ,..., )m    is a stochastic vector with joint c.d.f. F that possesses a continuous probability 
density. 
 
As mentioned above, the stochastic terms are supposed to account for the effect on 
preferences from variables that are not observed by the researcher. Under Assumption 1 and if 
F is a multivariate extreme value distribution with Gumbel marginals, then the implied choice 
model becomes the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) model (McFadden, 1978).  
Recall that the additive random utility structure assumed above, which is the same set-
up as in Dagsvik and Karlström (2005), represents no loss of generality. Bhattacharya (2015, 
2018) shows that one can obtain formulas for the distribution of CV and EV without 
assuming a separable utility structure as in Assumption 1. However, as Dagsvik (1994, 1995) 
and Joe (2001) have demonstrated, any random utility model can be approximated arbitrarily 
closely by a GEV model. Since the GEV family is a subclass of the random utility models 
generated by Assumption 1 it follows that there is no loss of generality in postulating 
Assumption 1. 
 The agent’s choice set of available alternatives may be a subset of the universal set of 
all possible alternatives. For simplicity, let {1, 2, …, m} denote the index of all possible 
alternatives. If alternative j is not available to the agent then the corresponding price, jw =   
and ( , ) / 0.j j jv w y w  =  Evidently, this represents no loss of generality. Let ( , )J w y  be the 
(Marshallian) choice function and 1( ,..., )mw w w=  the vector of prices. That is, ( , )J w y j=  if 
the discrete alternative j is chosen, given prices and income (w, y). It follows from McFadden 
(1981, pp. 212–14) that under Assumption 1 the choice probabilities are given by 
(2.1)               ( ) ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) max ( ( , ) ))j j j j r m r r rw,y P J w y j P v w y v w y  = = = + = +  
                                    1 1 2 2 2( ( , ), ( , ) ,..., ( , ))) .j m mF u v w y u v w y v u v w y du

−
= − − −  
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We call ( , )j w y  the Marshallian (or uncompensated) choice probability of choosing 
alternative j. The corresponding conditional demand function given the discrete alternative j 

















where jkv , k = 1, 2, denotes the derivative with respect to component k. We note that the 
conditional demand functions defined above are deterministic since they depend only on the 
deterministic terms of the utility function. More general utility specifications for 
discrete/continuous choice are given by Dubin and McFadden (1984), Hanemann (1984) and 
Dagsvik (1994).  
Define next the conditional expenditure function ( , ),j je w u  given alternative j, by the 
relation 
   ( , ( , )) ( , ( , ))j j j j j j j j ju U w e w u v w e w u = = +   
where u is a given utility level. When ( , )jv w y  is strictly increasing in y it follows that ( , )je w u
is uniquely determined. The expenditure function (unconditional) ( , )e w u  is therefore given by 
    ( , ) min ( , ).j j
j m
e w u e w u

=   
Since the utility function depends on random taste variables the expenditure function becomes 
stochastic. The Hicksian (or compensated) conditional demand Hjx given alternative j equals 
    ( , ) ( , ( , )).H Hj j j j j j jx x w u x w e w u= =   
Let ( , )HJ w u  denote the Hicksian discrete choice function given prices and utility level (w, u). 
The concept that corresponds to (aggregate) Hicksian demand is the Hicksian (or 
compensated) choice probability. It is defined as 
              ( , ) ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) ( , )).H Hj j jP w u P J w u j P e w u e w u= = = =   
Dagsvik and Karlström (2005, Theorem 2) have derived the formula for ( , )HjP w u  under 
Assumption 1. They also obtained a discrete version of Shephard’s lemma for the standard 
discrete choice case and, furthermore, the distribution of the expenditure function (Theorem 
1). Another way of expressing the Hicksian choice function is as ( , ) ( , ( , )).HJ w u J w e w u=  If 
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( , )J w y  and ( , )e w u  were independent random functions, then one could derive the Hicksian 
choice probability from the relation  
        
0
( ( , ) ) ( ( , ( , )) ) ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) ).HP J w u j P J w e w u j P J w y j P e w u dy

= = = = =    
Unfortunately, the random functions ( , )J w y  and ( , )e w u  are in general stochastically 




 Assume that Assumption 1 holds. Then  
          ( ( , ) | ( , ) ) ( ( , ) )P J w y j e w u y P J w y j= = = =  
 only if ( , ) /j jv w y y   is independent of j and F is a multivariate extreme value c.d.f.   
 
 The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. Proposition 1 shows that even if 
the choice model is a conditional logit model the deterministic part of the utility function must 
be linear in income with a coefficient associated with income which is independent of the 
alternatives. 
 
3. Joint ex-ante choice and ex-post compensated choice  
The focus of this paper is the analysis of compensated choice behavior in the two-period 
setting where the first period is called ex-ante (before the reform is introduced) and the second 
period ex-post (after the reform has been introduced). Let the income and price of alternative j 
ex-ante be equal to ( , )jy w  and the price of alternative j ex-post be equal to .jw  Recall that we 
have adopted the convention that when an alternative j (say) does not belong to the choice set 
of the consumer, the corresponding price (relative to the individual) is equal to infinity and 
accordingly the corresponding utility is equal to minus infinity. It is assumed that the 
stochastic terms of the utility function are not affected by the reforms. This assumption is 
common in these types of welfare analysis and it simply means that the welfare effects are 
interpreted as conditional on all factors other than the actual prices (or wages) being kept 
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fixed. Under Assumption 1 we shall, for simplicity, sometimes write jv  or ( )jv y  instead of 
( , ).j jv w y  Let ( , )V w y  be the (unconditional) ex-ante indirect utility functions defined by 
(3.1)       ( , ) max ( , )j j
j m
V w y U w y

= . 
Define jY  by  
     ( ; , ) ( , ( , ))j j j j jY Y w w y e w V w y= =   
for j belonging to the ex-post choice set and define Y  by 
       ( ; , ) min ( ; , ).j j
j m
Y Y w w y Y w w y

= =  
Whereas jY  is a conditional ex-post expenditure function given alternative j, Y is the 
unconditional ex-post expenditure function that yields the income required to maintain the ex-
post utility level equal to the ex-ante utility level. The corresponding compensating variation 
measure is defined by .CV Y y= −  Alternatively, Y can be obtained as the solution to the 
equation 
      ( , ) ( , ).jV w y V w Y=   
We have now defined the theoretical concepts that are necessary for deriving analytic 
results that are analogous to the one-period expenditure function and Hicksian demands. Let
( , , ; , , )HQ j k z w w y  be the joint probability of choosing alternative j ex-ante, alternative k ex-
post, and { }Y z  when the ex-post maximum utility is equal to the ex-ante maximum utility. 
Thus,   
              ( , , ; , , ) ( ( , ) max ( , ) ( , ) max ( , ), )H j j r r r k k r r rQ j k z w w z P U w z U w y U w Y U w Y Y z= = = =                
for 0.z   For notational simplicity we shall, most of the time, write ( , , )HQ j k z  instead of 
( , , ; , , ).HQ j k z w w y  Let ( , ) ( , , ),H HQ j k Q j k=   which is the joint compensated (Hicksian) 
probability of choosing alternative j ex-ante and alternative k ex-post (which means that the 
respective utility levels of the chosen alternatives before and after the reform are the same). 
Let  
( , , ) ( ( ; , ) ( ; , ))H Hj j j jQ Q w y w P Y w w y Y w w y= = =   
which is the probability of choosing alternative j ex-post conditional on the ex-post utility 
level being equal to the ex-ante utility level. Evidently, 
  
0
( , ).H Hj r




If ( , )V w y  were exogenous one could obtain H
jQ from ( , )
H
jP w u  because in this case one would 
have that ( , , ) ( , ( , )),H Hj jQ w w y EP w V w y=  where the expectation is taken with respect to ( , ).V w y  
However, Proposition 1 implies that the latter equation does not hold because ( , )V w y  and 
{ ( , )}j je w u  depend on the same random taste shifters { }j and in this sense ( , )V w y  is 
endogenous.  
 
4. The discrete Slutsky equation  
We start with a brief review of the Slutsky relation in standard consumer theory. Let ( , )jd p y
denote the (Marshallian) demand of commodity j as a function of prices and income (p, y) and 
let ( , )Hjd p u  denote the corresponding Hicksian demand function where u is the utility level 
and ( , )e p u  the corresponding expenditure function. The Hicksian demand function is not 
directly observable because it depends on the unobservable utility level. However, Slutsky 
(1915) showed how the marginal Hicksian demands can be obtained from the corresponding 
marginal Marshallian demands through the so-called Slutsky equation given by    
(4.1)            ( , ( , )) / ( , ) / ( , ( , )) ( , ( , )) /Hj k j k k jd p e p u p d p u p d p e p u d p e p u y.  =   −    
This equation allows one to compute the unobserved marginal compensated demands with 
respect to price changes by using the corresponding Marshallian demands (Varian, 1992). 
Consider next the two-period discrete case. This is more complicated because the 
preferences are stochastic and the ex-ante indirect utility is endogenous, as discussed above. 
Define, for positive j and k,  
        
0














  and  
0















The expressions above are the right and left derivatives of ( , , )HkQ w w y  with respect to the ex-
post price of alternative j. They correspond to the right and left marginal compensated effects 
of the choice probability of alternative k resulting from a price increase or a price decrease, 
respectively, of alternative j. As we shall see below, it turns out that in general one has 
/ /k j k jw w 




Theorem 1 (discrete Slutsky equation) 
 Assume that Assumption 1 holds with ( , )j jv w y  that is continuously differentiable and 
decreasing in 
jw  for all j. Then 







  +  
= − 
  















w w v y
 +   
= 
   
























The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix. Recall that in the conventional 
continuous case the demand for good j is given by Roy’s identity. Hence, jx has the 
interpretation as the conditional demand, given the choice j. Accordingly, we realize that only 
the equation determining /Hj jw
+   is similar to the standard Slutsky equation in (4.1) with 
income effect given by / .j jx y    
In many applications preferences are assumed to depend on non-pecuniary and 
alternative specific attributes. For example, in analysis of urban travel behavior attributes such 
as “on-vehicle times” and “out-of-vehicle times” play a major role. The results of Theorem 1 
or Corollary 1 can also be applied to calculate marginal compensating effects with respect to 
selected non-pecuniary attributes simply by replacing 
jw  with the selected attribute in the 
formulas of Theorem 1/Corollary 1. 
Surprisingly, the corresponding Slutsky equation for price decreases is different in that 
the marginal compensated price effect is equal to the marginal uncompensated price effect. In 
order to understand why, let us, for simplicity, consider the binary case with two alternatives. 
The argument in the general case with many alternatives is similar. Consider first the case 
where 
2w  increases to 2 2 ,w w  whereas 1w  remains unchanged. Then (1,2) 0
HQ =  because 
there is nothing to gain by switching from alternative 1 to alternative 2. Define
2y by the 
relation 
2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , ).v w y v w y=  Consider next the case where the agent chooses alternative 2 ex-
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ante and ex-post given that utility is kept constant. In this case expenditure Y is determined by 
2 2 2 2( , ) ( , )U w y U w Y= , which implies that 2.Y y=  We therefore obtain that  
(4.2)          1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2(2,2) ( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )).
HQ P U w y U w y U w y U w y=  =    
Evidently, 
2y y , which implies that 1 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , ).U w y U w y  Consequently, (4.2) reduces to 
       2 2 2 1 1 2(2,2) ( ( , ) ( , ))
HQ P U w y U w y=   
so that 
(4.3)      2 2 2 2( , , ) ( , ) (1,2) (2,2) ( , ) (2,2) ( , )
H H H HQ w w y w y Q Q w y Q w y  − = + − = −  
       
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2( ( , ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )P U w y U w y w y w y w y  =  − = −  
where 
1 2( , ).w w w=  Consider next the case where 2 2.w w  Then, evidently, 2(2,2)
HQ =  
because there is nothing to gain by switching to alternative 1. Furthermore, if alternative 1 
was chosen ex-ante the agent may switch to alternative 2 ex-post. This will happen if  
    
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1{ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )}.U w y U w y U w Y U w Y =    
The latter event implies that 
            
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2{ ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , )} { ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , )}U w Y U w y U w Y U w y v w Y v w y v w Y v w y       
which is equivalent to 
2{ ( , )}.Y y y  Consequently, it follows that  
(4.4)     2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1(1,2) ( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))
HQ P U w y U w y U w Y U w Y=  =    
     
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2( ( , ) ( , ), ( , )} ( ( , ) ( , ) ( , )).P U w y U w Y Y y y P U w y U w y U w y= =  =     
Accordingly, (4.4) yields 
(4.5) 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2( , , ) ( , ) (1,2) ( ( , ) ( , ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , ).
H HQ w w y w y Q P U w y U w y U w y w y w y  − = =   = −   
We note that the final expressions in (4.3) and (4.5) differ in an important way. The 
expression in (4.5) is equal to the own marginal uncompensated price effect. In the former 
case in (4.3) the corresponding expression is similar apart from the fact that income is 
replaced by 
2 .y  (For the sake of interpretation, note that by implicity differentiation and Roy’s 
identity it follows that 
2 2 2/ ).y w x  =  Thus, in the case of a price increase the own marginal 
compensated price effect is obtained by substituting income with 
2y  in the formula for the 
corresponding marginal uncompensated price effect. This means that  an income effect is 
present, represented by 
2 .y  This is due to the fact that when the price of alternative 2 increases 
the marginal own compensated price effect equals 2(2,2) ,
HQ −  whereas the marginal own 
compensated price effect equals (1,2)HQ  when the price of alternative 2 decreases. 
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The asymmetry in the Slutsky equation is not restricted to the case where utility is 
additively separable in a deterministic and a stochastic term. The essential difference from the 
separable case is that in the non-separable case 
2y  may be stochastic and determined by 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , , ) ( , , ).U w y U w y =  Still the argument above, with minor modification, goes through. 
Section 5 we demonstrate that the asymmetry in the Slutsky equation also may occur in the 
standard textbook model of labor force participation in the presence of non-linear taxes.  
We note above that in some cases, such as in models of labor suppy and occupational 
mobility, the utility function is increasing in prices (wage rates). By symmetry the result in 
next corollary follows readily from Theorem 1. 
 
Corollary 1 
 Assume that Assumption 1 holds with ( , )j jv w y  that is continuously differentiable and 
increasing in 
jw  for all j. Then 







  −  
= + 
  















w w v y
 −   
= 
   
























From Theorem 1 the next corollary is also immediate. 
 
Corollary 2 
Assume that Assumption 1 holds with ( , ) ( )j j jv w y y w= −  for some function ( )y  that 
is independent of j. Then 
            ,
H
j j j
j jw w y



























for ,k j , 0.j k   
 
 As mentioned above, the case of discrete labor supply models (e.g. van Soest, 1995, 
and Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006) is analyzed in a separate paper (Dagsvik et al., 2019). The 
reason is that this case does not immediately fit into the framework considered here because 
the price (wage rate) is the same for all alternatives (different hours of work schedules).  
 Consider next the discrete/continuous case where the conditional demand functions are 
determined by Roy’s identity, as explained above. Let ,j j jX x =  where 1x  is given by (2.2). 
That is, jX is the unconditional (aggregate) demand for alternative j in the case of 
discrete/continuous choice. For the conditional demands the direct marginal effect must 













Furthermore, since kx does not depend on jw  for ,k j it follows that / 0.
H
k jx w  =  We 











   
=  + 
  
  
and the next corollary follows from Theorem 1. 
 
 Corollary 3 
 Under Assumption 1 it follows that  






























w w v y
+   
= 
   










for .k j  
 
 We observe that the relations in Corollary 3 differ in important ways from the 
corresponding (misleading) relations given in Small and Rosen (1981, pp. 116–18). 
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5. Special cases   
Example 1: Urban travel demand  
This example is taken from McFadden (1981, pp. 242–245). McFadden and his associates 
analyzed work-trip choice with four travel modes (bus, auto alone, rapid transit (BART), 
carpool) in the San Francisco Bay Area. One of the models they estimated was a multinomial 
logit model where the systematic part of the utility function of individual i was assumed to 
have the form 
(5.1)        
1 1 2 2( , ) ,
j
j j j j j
w
v w y Z Z
y
   = + + +  1 0 =   
where y  is the wage rate, jw  is the cost of alternative j, 1 jZ  is “on-vehicle time” of 
alternative j, 
2 jZ  is “access time” of alternative j, and { },j , 1 , and 2  are unknown 
parameters. Train and McFadden (1978) have provided a theoretical justification of the utility 
as a function of the wage rate. Another justification is that if hours of work is given (such as 
full-time or part-time hours), then the wage rate is equal to the wage income, apart from a 
multiplicative constant.2 The estimates of these parameters are given in Table 5.2, p. 244, in 
McFadden (1981). Below we give the uncompensated and compensated elasticities with 
respect to traveling costs and traveling times. Policy reforms that involve changes in traveling 
times may be implemented by reducing or increasing the number of transits and bus stops or 
transfers.  























































































for .k j  From the above results it follows that 
                                                     
2 In most jobs, hours of work are fixed, possibly job-specific, and determined by institutional regulations or the nature of the 
jobs. 
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    
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Similarly, it follows that the compensated elasticities with respect to traveling times are given 
by 















































































   
and  













From (5.3a, b) and (5.4a, b) we realize that the difference between the right and left marginal 
compensated elasticities may be substantial. 
 
Example 2: Labor force participation with non-linear taxes 
Consider the following model of labor force participation of married women. The women face 
the choice of working full-time (alternative 2) h with wage income ,w  or not working 
(alternative 1). Hours of work h is normalized to 1. Let a  represent the disutility of fixed 
costs of working, y is non-labor income (husband’s income) and ( , )f w y  the function that 
transforms gross income labor income w and nonlabor income y to income after taxes. We 
assume that ( , )f w y  is continuously differentiable. The utility of working is given by 
(5.5a)  2 2






= − + +   
and the utility of not working is given by 
(5.5b)  1 1






= +  
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where   and 0   are parameters and , 1,2,j j =  are random errors. When 0 =  (5.5a, b) 
become 
  2 log ( , )U a f w y= − +  and   1 1log (0, ) .U f y = +  
Note that in this case utility is increasing in wage income. This implies that the right marginal 
compensated wage effects are equal to the corresponding uncompensated wage effects 
whereas the left marginal compensated wage effects differ from the corresponding 
uncompensated effects. Let 2  be the probability of participation. In the special case where 
the error terms are independent with standard Gumbel c.d.f. exp( exp( ))x− − , then the 
probability of participation 




1 exp( ( (0, ) 1) / (( ( , )) 1) / )a f y f w y 

   
=
+ + − − −
  
Furthermore, it follows from (5.5a, b) and Corollary 1 that  
  12 2 1 2 2( ( , )) ( , ) (1 ),
H
f w y f w y
w w
    
+
−  = = −
 







2 2 2 2( ( , ) ( , ) (0, ) (0, ))(1 )f w y f w y f y f y
   − − − −   
and we therefore obtain that   
  
1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
( , ) / (0, ) (0, )
(1 ).
( , ) / ( , )
H v w y w f y f y
w w v w y y y f w y
   
 
− −     
= −  = −
    
 
Thus, in this case 
(5.6)  2 2 2 2
2
( , ) /
( , ) /
H H v w y w
w w v w y y y
  − +    
− = 







( , )( ( , ) ( , ) (0, ) (0, ))
(1 ) .
( , )








When 1 =  the formula in (5.6) reduces to 
(5.7)  2 2 1 2 2 2 2
2
( , )( ( , ) (0, ))
(1 ) .
( , )
H H f w y f w y f y
w w f w y
  
 




The relation in (5.7) shows that even when utility is linear in disposable income the left and 
right marginal compensated wage effects are different if taxes are non-linear. If wife and 
husband are taxed separately, then 
2 2( , ) (0, ) 0f w y f y − = , implying that the left and right marginal 
compensated wage effects are equal. 
19 
Example 3: The standard labor force participation model with non-linear taxes  
 
Here we consider the labor force participation of married women when the model is assumed 
to be the standard textbook one where the worker is allowed to choose any level of continuous 
hours of work (subject to an upper limit on hours). Let h  denote hours of work and 
2w  the 
wage rate. We assume that the function ( , ),f wh y  which transforms labor income 2hw  and 
non-labor income y to income after taxes, is strictly concave in the wage rate 
2.w  In this case 
it follows that the woman would choose to work if 
2 1 1(0, )w f y w   and choose not to work 
otherwise, where 1w  is the woman’s reservation wage (marginal rate of substitution at zero 
hours of work). In empirical applications it is necessary to represent the wage rate and the 
reservation wage by instrument variable equations. To this end assume that   
          2 2 2log w z = +     and   1 1 1log w z = +   
where 1z  and 2z  are the respective systematic parts of the log wage and log reservation wage 
equations that depend on suitable covariates, and 1  and 2  are zero mean random variables, 
possibly correlated, and independent of 1z  and 2 .z  Let F  be the c.d.f. of 1 2. −  It thus 
follows that the probability of participation becomes 
(5.8)            
2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1( log (0, ) ) (log (0, ) ).P z f y z F f y z z   = + +  + = + −   
From (5.8) it follows that 
(5.9)               2 1 2 1
2
(log (0, ) )F f y z z
z
 = + −

   
and     
(5.10)               2 121 2 1
1
(0, )
(log (0, ) ) .
(0, )
f y
F f y z z
y f y
  = + −
 
  
Hence, (5.9), (5.10) and Corollary 1 imply, with 1 1v z=  and 2 1 2log (0, ) ,v f y z= +  that 
















Recall that the reservation wage does not depend on income. Thus, when the wage rate 
decreases the utility of the chosen alternative remains constant if the marginal wage rate at 
zero hours of work, 
1 2(0, ) ,f y w  remains constant, which is obtained by a suitable increase of 
20 
income. This means that neither the reservartion wage nor the marginal wage rate at zero 
hours of work changes, implying that the corresponding marginal effect is zero when 
12(0, ) 0.f y   If, however, 12 (0, ) 0f y = , then the marginal compensated wage effect equals the 
corresponding uncompensated effect given in (5.9). 
In the current Norwegian tax system wives and husbands are taxed separately, so 
12(0, ) 0.f y =  In the previous Norwegian tax system, however, wives and husbands were taxed 
jointly when the wife’s income was sufficiently low. Thus, in this latter case the function that 
transforms gross income to disposable income has the form ( , ) ( )f hw y g hw y= + , which 
implies that 
12(0, ) ( ).f y g y =   
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed marginal compensated effects in discrete choice models and 
we have established the Slutsky equation for such models. As we have seen, the discrete 
Slutsky equation has the special feature that marginal compensated price effects in the case of 
a price increase differ from marginal compensated price effects in the case of a price decrease.  
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Let ( , ) ( , ) ,j j jU x y v x y = + 1,2,..., ,j m= with random error terms { }j  that have joint c.d.f. F 
with deterministic terms { ( , )}jv w y  that are strictly increasing in y. For simplicity, write ( , )j j jv v w y=  
for the ex ante systematic part of the utility function and let w  be the vector of ex post prices. Then  
(i) (max ( , ) ( , ) max ( , ) ( , ) , )r m r r j j r m r r k kP U w y U w y U w Y U w Y du Y dz = = =    
       
1 2( ( ),..., ,..., ( , ), ( )) ( , )jk j k m k kF u z u v u v w z u z v w dz du = − − − −  
for j ky y y ,  ,k j k, j > 0, and  
(ii) (max ( , ) ( , ) max ( , ) , )r r r j j r r r jP U w y U w y U w Y du Y y= =  =   
       
1( ( ),..., ,..., ( ))j j j m jF u y u v u y du = − − −  
where ( ) max( , ( , ))j j j jz v v w z =  and jy  is determined by ( , ).j j j jv v w y=   
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Consider first the proof of (i). Let J  and J denote the ex-ante and ex-post choice given that the ex-ante 
and ex-post utility levels of the chosen alternatives are equal. Let F be the joint c.d.f. of 
1 2( , ,..., ).m    
For notational convenience, let ( , )r r rU U w y=  and ( ) ( , ).r r rU Y U w Y=  We have that 
      {1,2} 1 2 2 1{ 1, 2} {max ,max ( ) ( ) }.r r r rJ J U U U Y U Y U = =    =   
For alternative 1 to be the most preferred alternative ex-ante and alternative 2 the most preferred alter-
native ex-post, one must have 2 1 2( ) .U Y U U=   Hence, we must have that 2.Y y  Furthermore, since 
alternative 2 is the most preferred one ex-post, 2 1( ) ( ),U Y U Y  which implies that 1 1( )U Y U  and 
1.Y y  Accordingly, the event { 1, 2}J J= =  has positive probability only if 1 2.y y  Moreover, the 
event 2 1{ ( ) }U z U=  
implies that 1 1 2 1{ ( ) , }.U z U U U   
Accordingly, the relation above yields 
 {1,2} 1 2{ 1, 2, } {max max( , ( )) ( )}.r r rJ J Y z U U z U U z= = =   =  
Thus, the corresponding probabilities are therefore given by 
 1( 1, , [ , ), ( ))P J J k Y z z z U u,u u= =  +   +   
1 2 2 1(max ,max ( ) ( ), ( , ), ( , )) ( )r r r rP U u U Y U Y Y z z z U u u u o u =    +   +  +   
 1 2 2 2 1(max ,max ( ) , ( ) ( ), ( , )) ( )r r r rP U u U z u U z u U z z U u u u o u =     +   +  +   
{1,2} 2 2 1(max max( , ( )) , ( ) ( ), ( , )) ( )r r rP U U z u U z u U z z U u u u o u=    +  + +   
{1,2} 2 2 1(max ( ( ) ) , ( ) ( ), ( , )) ( )r r rP z u U z u U z z U u u u o u = +    +  + +   
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 1 1 2 2 3( , ( , ), ( ),..., ( ))mF u v u v w z u z u z u = − − − −    
1 1 2 2 3( , ( , ), ( ),..., ( )) ( )mF u v u v w z z u z u z u o u − − − + − −  +   
12 1 2 2 3 2( , ( , ), ( ),..., ( )) ( ) ( ) .mF u v u v w y u z u z v z u+o z u = − − − −      
This proves (i) of Lemma A1. Consider now the second part (ii). We have that 
 (max max ( , ) , )r j r j r j r r jP U U U w Y du Y y    =  
 (max max ( , ) )r j r j r j r r jP U U U w y du =     
 (max ( ( )) )r j r r j j jP y v du  = +  +   
 
1( ( ),..., ,..., ( ))j j j m jF u y u v u y du, = − − −  
which proves the second part. 




1 2, ,..., ,mb b b  be positive constants and 1 2( , ,..., )mF x x x  a multivariate c.d.f. defined on 
mR  
that possesses a p.d.f. Assume that F satisfies the partial differential equation 
 
1 2 1 2
1 2
( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., )
( , ,..., )
m j m k
j m
kj k
F u x u x u x b F u x u x u x b
P x x x
x x
 + + +  + + +
=
 
   
for some positive function 
1 2( , ,..., ) (0,1),j mP x x x   defined on .
mR  Then F must have the form 
    1 1 2 2
1 2( , ,..., ) ( ( , ,..., ))
m mb xb x b x
mF x x x G e e e
−− −
=   
where : (0, ) [0,1]  →  is a strictly decreasing function and 1 2( , ,..., ) :[0, ) [0, )
m
mG z z z  →   is a 
strictly decreasing and linear homogenous function. In other words, F is a multivariate extreme value 
c.d.f. (Resnick, 1987). 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Assume first that 1jb =  for all j. By applying the method of Lagrange for solving partial differential 
equations (Sneddon, 1957), the first stage is to solve the differentical equation  





=   
which yields  
(A.1)    
1 2( , ,..., )j m ju Q x x x C− =   
for all j, where /j j jQ x P  =  and jC  is a constant. The equation in (A.1) implies that  
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1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) .j m m j m jQ x x x Q x x x C C Q x x x c= + − = +   
Then it follows that the solution of the differentical equation in Lemma 2 in this case must satisfy 
1 1 2 1 2( ( , ,..., ), ( , ,..., )) 0j m mu Q x x x F u x u x u x − + + + =  for some arbitrary continuously differentia-
ble function   in two variables. The latter equation implies that  
(A.2) 1 2 1 1 2( , ,..., ) ( exp ( , ,..., )).
u
m j mF u x u x u x e Q x x x
−+ + + =   
for some suitable positive and continuously differential function [0,1].j   Evidently, j  must be 
strictly decreasing and independent of j because the left hand side of (A.2) is a c.d.f. that is independent 
of j. With no loss of generality we can rewrite (A.2) as  
(A.3) 1 2
1 2( , ,..., ) ( ( , ,..., ))
mxx xu
mF u x u x u x e G e e e
−− −−+ + + =  
where 
1 2 1 1 2( , ,..., ) exp ( log , log ,..., log ).m mG z z z Q z z z= − −  Eq. (A.3) implies that  
 1 2 1 2( ( , ,..., )) ( ( , ,..., ))m m
u x xu x u x x xuG e e e e G e e e − − −− − − − − −−=  
which yields  
  1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., )m m
u x xu x u x x xuG e e e e G e e e
− − −− − − − − −−=  
and thus establishes linear homogeneity of G. Furthermore, we realize that in the general case the partial 
differential equation in Lemma 2 with 1jb   must have the solution  
 1 1 2 2
1 2( , ,..., ) ( ( , ,..., )).
m mb xb x b x
mF x x x G e e e
−− −
=  
          Q.E.D. 
   
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Note first that  
  ( , )j je w u y    ( , ) .j j jv w y u+    
Let , 1,2,..., ,ky k m=  be positive real numbers. Then the relation above implies that 
  1 1 1 2 2 2( ( , ) , ( , ) ,..., ( , )m m mP e w u y e w u y e w u)> y    
  1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ( , ) , ( , ) ,..., ( , ) ).m m m mP v w y u v w y u v w y u  = +  +  +   
Accordingly,  
(A.4)  ( ( , ) ) (max ( ( , ) ) )k m k k kP e w u y P v w y u = +   
  1 1 2 2( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ))M MF u v w y u v w y u v w y= − − −  
and 
(A.5)  ( ( , ) , ( , ) ) (min ( , ) ( , ) )k m k k j jP J w y j e w u dy P e w u e w u dy=  = =    
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1 1 2 2 2( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , ) .j m m j jF u v w y u v w y u v w y v w y dy= − − −  
From (A.4) and (A.5) it follows that 
 (A.6)     
1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 21
( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )
( ( , ) | ( , ) ) .
( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )
j M m j j
m
r M m r jr
F u v w y u v w y u v w y v w y
P J w y j e w u y
F u v w y u v w y u v w y v w y
=
 − − −
= = =
 − − −
 
Since the choice probability ( ( , ) )P J w y j=  is independent of u it follows from Lemma 2 with 
2( , )j j jb v w y=  that F must have the form 
            1 1 2 2
1 2( , ,..., ) ( ( , ,..., )).
m mb xb x b x
mF x x x G e e e
−− −
=  
But since F is the joint c.d.f. of the vector of random error terms Assumption 1 implies that 
2( , )j j jb v w y=  must be a constant, independent of j. 
           Q.E.D. 
Let 
jy be determined by ( , ) ( , ).j j j j jv w y v w y=  That is, jy  is the ex-post income that en-
sures that the deterministic parts of the ex-ante utility and ex-post utility of alternative j are 
equal. If alternative j belongs to the ex ante choice set but not the ex post choice set, we define 
.jy =   If alternative j belongs to the ex post choice set but not the ex ante choice set, we define




Under Assumption 1 the Hicksian (compensated) choice probability of changing from 
alternative j to alternative k is given by3 





jk m k k
y
Q j k H z z z v w dz  = −  
when ,k j  j, k > 0, ,j ky y  where ( ) max( ( , ), ( , ))r r r r rz v w y v w z =  for all r. Furthermore, when  
j = k, then 
(A.8)  
1 2( , ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( )).
H
j j j m jQ j j H y y y  =  
When j ky y , j k ,   j, k > 0, then ( ) 0
HQ j,k .=   
 
                                                     
3 There is an error in the corresponding formula for ( , )
HQ j j  in Theorem 4 in Dagsvik and Karlström (2005). 
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Lemma 3 implies that ( , ) 0HQ j k =  when ,j j r rw w w w =  for , ,r j k  .k kw w  Suppose 
that *( , ) ( )r r r rv w y v y w= −  for all r where 
*
rv  is an increasing function. Then, under the assump-
tions of Theorem 1 it follows that for ,j k   
 













    and ( , ) ( , )
H
jQ j j w y=  
when .j ky y  Thus, we realize that the integrand of the integral in the expression for ( , )
HQ j k
in this case can be obtained from the Marshallian choice probabilities as functions of the deter-
ministic functions { ( )}.r z    
 Lemma 3 has originally been derived by Dagsvik and Karlström (2005). In this paper 
we provide a simplified proof given in the appendix. Note that ( , )HQ j j  given in (A.8) has the 
same structure as a choice probability, namely the probability of choosing alternative j when 
the utility of alternative j equals ( ) ,j jz +  j = 1, 2, …, m. 
. .  
Proof of Lemma 3:   
From Lemma 1(i) (with the same notation as in Lemma 1) it follows that 
(A.9) ( , , [ , ))P J j J k Y z z z= =  +   
 2 1 3( ) ( ( ),.., ( ), ( ),..., ( )) ( ).k k jk k k mv w ,z z F u z u v w ,z u z u z du +o z  

−
 =  − − − −    
Furthermore, we know that  
 1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( max ( )) ( , ,.., ) .j m j j r r r j mH v v v P v v F x v x v x v dx 

−
  + = + = − − −   
Evidently, differentiation under the integral above is allowed in this case, which yields that  
            
2 1 2 3( , ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ),.., ( ))k k jk k mv w z zH z v w ,z z z   −   
 2 1( ) ( ( ), ( ),.., ( ))k k jk k k mv w ,z z F x z x v w ,z x z dx 

−
 =  − − −   
 ( 1, , [ , )) ( ).P J J k Y z z z o z= = =  +  +   
Furthermore, since alternative 1 is chosen ex ante and alternative 2 ex post it must be the case that 
( , ) ( , )j j j jU w y U w Y  and ( , ) ( , )k k k kU w Y U w y  implying that ( , ) ( , )j j j jv w y v w Y  and 
( , ) ( , ).k k k kv w Y v w y  Hence, it must be true that the probability in (A.9) wanished unless 
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.k jy Y y   By integrating (A.9) with respect to z between ky  and jy  yields (A.7). The relation in  
(A.8) follows from Lemma 1 (ii).  
                                     Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
By assumption ( )r rv w ,y  is strictly decreasing in prices and strictly increasing in income. Let the price 
of alternative j increase from jw  to j j jw w w= +  where jw  is small and positive. Then, ( )j jy w y  
and ry y=  for .r j  Hence, it follows from Lemma 2 that ( , ) 0
HQ r j =  for .r j  Furthermore, from 
the definition of ( )jy u  it follows that ( , ( )) ( , )j j j jv u y u v w y=  for any given real u. By implicit differ-




( ) ( , )
.
( , )
j j j j j j
j j j j j
y w y v w y v
w w v w y v
  
= = − = −
  
 
where ( ).j j jy y w=  Since ,jy y  max ( ( , ), ( , )) ( , )r r r r r j r r jv w y v w y v w y=  and we get from Lemma 2 
and (A.10) that 
(A.11)     
1 1 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ),.., ( , ))
H H
j j j j j j j m m j
r
Q r j Q j j H v w y v w y v w y v w y  − = − =   
     
1 1 2 2( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ))j m mH v w y v w y v w y−  
        1 1 2 2 2
( )
( ( , ), ( , ),... ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , ) ( )
j j
jr j j m m r r j j
r jj
y w
H v w y v w y v w y v w y v w y w o w
w 

 =  + 

       
1 1 2 2 1
1 1 2 2
2
( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )
( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( )
( , )
j m m j j
jj m m j j
j j
H v w y v w y v w y v w y
H v w y v w y v w y w o w
y v w y
  
= −  +  
 
         
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
2
( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )
( )
( , )
j m m j m m j j
j j
j j j
H v w y v w y v w y H v w y v w y v w y v w y
w o w
w y v w y
   






j j j j j j
j j j j
y v
w w y w v y
       
= +  = − 


















   

 
the first part of the theorem follows from (A.11).  
 Consider next the corresponding cross price effects. That is, we consider the marginal compen-
sated effect on k  when .k j  We have that ( , ) 0
HQ r k =  for r j  and ( , ) 0.HQ j k   From Lemma 2 
we obtain that 
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(A.12)          
( )
1 1 2( , ) ( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , )
j jy w
H
jk j j k k m m k k
y
Q j k H v w x v w y v w x v w x v w x dx = −   
which together with (A.10) imply that  
(A.13)       
1 1 2( , ) ( ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )( ( ) ) ( )
H
jk m m k k j j jQ j k H v w y v w y v w y y w y o w = − − +      
        =
1 1 2
1
( ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )( ( ) )
( )
( , )
k m m k k j j
j
j k j
H v w y v w y v w y y w y
o w
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1 2
( ) ( , )( , )
( ) ( ).
( , ) ( , )
j j j k k jk k k k
j j
j j k j j j k
y w w v w y wv w y
o w o w
w v w y w w v w y
     
= −   +  =  + 
   
     
Furthermore, it follows that 
(A.14)  ( , ) .H kQ k k =   




( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , )
lim lim .
( , )j j
H H H H
k k k k k
w w
j j j j j k
Q j k Q k k v w yQ j k
w w w w v w y
  +
 →  →
   + − 
= = =  
      
  
 Consider next the case where jw is negative. Then it follows that jy y  so that
( ) ( )r j r ry v w ,y =  implying that ( , ) .
H
jQ j j =  From Lemma 3 we get that  
    1 1 2) ( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , )( ( )) ( )
H
rj j j k k m m j j j j jQ (r, j H v w y v w y v w y v w y v w x y y w o w = − − +   
      1 1 2( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , ) ( ) ( )rj j j m m j j j j j jH v w y v w y v w y v w y w y w o w  =  +    




( , ) ( , )
( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( )
( , )
j j j j j
kj j j m m j
j j
v w y w v w y
H v w y v w y v w y o w
v w y
 
= −  + 

 
     1 1 1( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , ) ( ).kj j j m m j j j jH v w x v w y v w y w v w y o w = −  +   
Consequently, we obtain that  




Q r j Q r j

− =    
 1 1 1( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , ) ( )rj j j m m j j j j
r j
H v w x v w y v w y w v w y o w

 = −  +   
 1 1 1( ( , ),.., ( , ),.., ( , )) ( , ) ( )kj j j m m j j j j
k j
H v w x v w y v w y w v w y o w

 = −  +   
 ( ) ( )
jk
j j j j
k j j j





= −  +  =  + 
 
   










We also have that ( , ) 0HQ j k =  when ,k j  and that 
 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( ( , ),.., ( , ), ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )).
H
k j j j j j j m mQ k k H v w y v w y v w y v w y v w y− − + +=   
Therefore, we get that 
   ( , ) ( , )H Hk k
r
Q r k Q k k − = −   
 1 1( ( , ),.., ( , ),..., ( , )) .k j j m m kH v w y v w y v w y = −    
By first order Taylor expansion the last expression becomes    
 1 1 2 2 1( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , ) ( ) ( )
k j
kj m m j j j j j
j
w
H v w y v w y v w y v w y w o w o w
w
 
   +  = + 

 








          
                Q.E.D. 
 
